Members of the Communications Workers of America—who build, maintain and support our nation’s communications infrastructure—have seen firsthand the need for the Affordable Connectivity Program (ACP) in our cities, suburbs and rural areas. We are committed to ensuring equitable access to reliable high-speed internet service and ensuring that the $65 billion investment in broadband buildout from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) fulfills the “jobs” part of this critical legislation. That means creating good jobs for workers across states throughout the country, with fair wages and benefits that will lift up more families. Besides being a lifeline for low-income households, the ACP is key to the success of the IIJA’s broadband investments. As providers evaluate building connections in unserved and underserved areas, they consider the economics of ongoing service to that area. If more Americans can afford internet service, there is more reason to build out to those areas—and more good jobs created to build and support new connections. But without the ACP, internet service providers will have less incentive to build high-speed broadband in areas that need it most—and we put at risk the IIJA’s historic investment in closing the digital divide. Frankly put, it would be a massive mistake to curtail the very program that is helping to make broadband universally affordable at a time when cost is one of the biggest barriers facing households across the nation. 

[Claude Cummings Jr. is president of the Communications Workers of America.]

In the wake of the FCC's December decision to change its rules on pole attachments, industry groups and utility companies are continuing to give their input. The proposed reforms, detailed in the Commission's third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, aim to streamline dispute resolution processes and enhance transparency to facilitate the expansion of broadband infrastructure. The FCC also requested feedback on its proposal. While many support the reform broadly, both industry groups (comprising telephone companies and cable companies) and utility companies (often the pole owners) submitted recommendations to the Commission this week regarding its proposed rule changes around large pole attachment orders, self-help and use of contractors, among other things.

The $42.5 billion Broadband Equity, Access and Deployment (BEAD) program is top of mind right now, as states kick off their challenge process to figure out which locations need to be covered by BEAD projects. Tarana Wireless hosted a webinar to address questions for internet service providers. Gabriel Moran, government affairs and policy associate at Tarana, said a lot of the discussion surrounding the BEAD program has “overlooked and sometimes [misunderstood] the significance of the steps that make up the pre-bid process.” Moran explained in the conversations Tarana’s had with provider, “many folks have indicated they do not intend to submit project bid applications as part of the BEAD program.” Moran said that this is understandable, but that providers should still participate in the BEAD challenge process, calling it an opportunity “to help prevent any sort of BEAD overbuild from threatening [a provider's] network. It’s also an opportunity for provider “to capitalize on offensive growth opportunities that frankly, may no longer exist after the BEAD program is finished.”

At the Munich Security Conference, leading technology companies pledged to help prevent deceptive AI content from interfering with the 2024 global elections in which more than four billion people in over 40 countries will vote. The “Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive Use of AI in 2024 Elections” is a set of commitments to deploy technology countering harmful AI-generated content meant to deceive voters. Signatories pledge to work collaboratively on tools to detect and address online distribution of such AI content, drive educational campaigns, and provide transparency, among other concrete steps. Participating companies agreed to eight specific commitments:

1. Prevention: Researching, investing in, and/or deploying reasonable precautions to limit risks of deliberately Deceptive AI Election Content being generated.
2. Provenance: Attaching provenance signals to identify the origin of content where appropriate and technically feasible.
3. Detection: Attempting to detect Deceptive AI Election Content or authenticated content, including with methods such as reading provenance signals across platforms.
4. Responsive Protection: Providing swift and proportionate responses to incidents involving the creation and dissemination of Deceptive AI Election Content.
5. Evaluation: Undertaking collective efforts to evaluate and learn from the experiences and outcomes of dealing with Deceptive AI Election Content.
6. Public Awareness: Engaging in shared efforts to educate the public about media literacy best practices, in particular regarding Deceptive AI Election Content, and ways citizens can protect themselves from being manipulated or deceived by this content.
7. Resilience: Supporting efforts to develop and make available defensive tools and resources, such as AI literacy and other public programs, AI-based solutions (including open-source tools where appropriate), or contextual features, to help protect public debate, defend the integrity of the democratic process, and build whole-of-society resilience against the use of Deceptive AI Election Content.